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Corporate Governance and Audit Features: SMEs Evidence 
Basil Al-Najjar  
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This study investigates the effect of corporate governance factors on audit features, 
namely, audit fees and the selection of big 4 audit firms within the UK SMEs context. 
Design:  We use different regression models to investigate the impact of corporate 
governance characteristics on audit features, and employ cross-sectional –time series models 
as well as 2 Stages Least Squares (2SLS) technique. In addition, we have used logit analysis 
to examine the effect of corporate governance factors on the selection of Big 4 audit firms.  
Findings: We provide new evidence that governance mechanisms in SMEs affect different 
audit features. Our results show that corporate governance mechanisms are important in 
determining audit fees. We detect a positive impact of board independence, audit meeting and 
board size on audit fees. We also report evidence that governance factors determine the 
selection of big 4 audit firms. In particular, we report that independent directors and audit 
diligence positively affect the decision to select big 4 audit firms.  
Originality: This paper investigates the under-researched relationship between audit features 
and corporate governance using UK SMEs. In so doing, we aim to provide new insights into 
this relationship within the SMEs context. 
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Introduction 
The main aim of this study is to investigate the under-researched relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and audit fees within SMEs context. Indeed, such 
relationship has been investigated in large firms (Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent, 2006; Knechel, 2016), yet we find no evidence of this relationship within the SMEs 
context. We adopt this framework for different reasons. First, there is growing evidence that 
governance features are important in SMEs as in large firms. It is found that good corporate 
governance will bring better alternatives for SMEs and provides SMEs with effective 
strategies and best practices to access different resources and enhances better management 
decisions (Drucker, 1992; Sparrow, 1993). Accordingly, we aim to investigate in more details 
the theoretical and empirical aspects of corporate governance and audit features in SMEs 
using panel data set and to expand our knowledge of the audit features within the SMEs 
context. Second, investigating SMEs is very important in the UK; for example, in 2007, 
99.9% of the businesses were SMEs. In addition, SMEs are a key employer in the UK with 
approximately 59.2% of private sector employees. From the macro-level perspective, SMEs 
represent 50% of the UK gross value added and 51.5% turnover (BIS, 2009). Hence, our 
study has an importance for policy makers and managers for a key Sector in the UK. Finally, 
Afrifa and Tauringana (2015) detect that corporate governance is related to SMEs 
performance in the UK, however, they reported some differences in the role of corporate 
governance factors between small and medium-size firms. Hence, investigating the role of 
corporate governance in SMEs will be of importance and will add to our understanding of the 
determinants of audit fees.   
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An important strand of the empirical literature aims to examine different audit features. For 
example, the factors affecting audit fees (see among others; Simunic, 1980; Simon and 
Francis, 1988; Low et al., 1990; Lifschutz, et al., 2010; Knechel, 2016). From the UK 
context, Taylor and Baker (1981), Chan et al. (1993), Clatworthy and Peel (2007) have 
investigated different aspects of audit fees. O’Sullivan and Diacon (1994) investigate the link 
between audit fees and internal corporate governance. They argue that internal corporate 
governance mechanisms have a negative impact on audit fees. Their results show that firms 
with stronger internal corporate governance pay less audit fees, indicating that more strict 
control of auditing comes from internal audit committee and in turn, external auditors’ 
assurance and assessment are less important. In contrast, Francis (2004) suggests that there is 
a positive association between audit quality and audit fees, and firms with better quality audit 
will eventually improve financial reporting process, and consequently minimise the 
likelihood of having a qualified opinion (the opinion assessed by auditors whereby a firm’s 
financial statement is prone to misstatement ).  
In this study, we aim to provide new evidence on the link between corporate governance and 
audit features from UK SMEs context. In so doing, we shed light on the under-researched 
issue of corporate governance in SMEs, one significant reason behind such limited evidence 
is the data availability “regarding corporate governance” for such enterprises. From around 
2550 SMEs (our main sample) only listed SMEs provide the required information.  
In particular, we aim to answer the following question: Can corporate governance affect audit 
fees and audit quality? This paper is the first major study to investigate these issues in the UK 
SMEs context. Our results show that corporate governance is important in determining audit 
fees, with a positive impact of board independence, audit meeting, and board size on audit 
fees. Also, we detect some evidence of a negative relationship between audit independence 
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and audit fees, supporting the supply side of audit fees. Finally, we report that independent 
directors and audit diligence positively affect the decision to select one of the big 4 audit 
firms.   
The remainder of this paper is set as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature of audit 
features; Section 3 presents the main hypotheses to be analysed; Section 4 provides the data 
and methodology; Section 5 outlines the empirical findings of audit fees model; Section6 
highlights the audit quality. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
Literature Review 
In this section, we aim to discuss the theoretical framework and the empirical evidence 
regarding the audit features. We start the discussion with the theoretical and economic 
framework underlying audit features and then we discuss the empirical evidence.   
Theoretical framework  
We follow the economic framework of Carcello et al. (2002) and Simunic and Stein (1996) 
and argue that audit fees reflect the financial related costs of efficient and active auditors; 
such costs vary depending on different financial and governance features of the audited firm. 
The importance of corporate governance on audit features, such as audit fees, has increased 
after the legal authorities increase their emphasis on the importance of internal monitoring in 
running firm operations (see, for example, Cadbury report, 1992; Smith report, 2003).  
The theoretical aspect of audit fees literature is based on two strands, namely the demand side 
perspective, and supply side point of view (see, Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent, 2006). A positive association between audit fees and corporate governance is based on 
the demand perspective of audit fees. This positive relationship indicates that firms with good 
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corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to demand more audit services to alleviate 
agency costs and thus resulting in higher audit fees (Abbott et al., 2003). In contrast, the 
supply side view sustains a negative link between audit fees and corporate governance 
features. This is due to effective and active firms’ internal control mechanisms that will put 
pressure on external auditors to reduce control risk and in turn decrease the auditing hours. 
Different studies have supported the demand side; for example, Carcello et al. (2002) detect 
the importance of board features on audit fees. Regarding the audit committee, Abbott et al. 
(2003), Lee and Mande (2005) and Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) report that audit 
meetings, audit independence and audit size increase audit fees. In contrast, Tsui et al. (2001) 
argue that firms with strong internal corporate governance aspects are less likely to demand 
more audit assessment and pay more audit fees. Accordingly, it is important to investigate the 
demand/supply side in our sample by including different internal monitoring mechanisms 
such as board and audit characteristics as internal monitoring tools. 
Empirical Evidence  
Audit quality can be seen as auditors’ ability to report any misstatements detected in the 
auditing process (see, for example, Mohamed and Habib, 2013; Knechel, 2016). Different 
researchers have argued that the likelihood of auditors to detect misstatements is related to 
audit features such as reputation, audit firm size and audit independence (Knechel, 2016; 
Habbash and Alghamdi, 2017). Paying high audit fees might reflect auditor efforts and 
quality (Chen et al., 2016). Indeed, large audit firms (Big 4 or equivalent) aim to endure their 
reputation as well as have better training programmes and hence intend to provide a proper 
audit report (high quality) (Eshleman and Guo, 2014; Habbash and Alghamdi, 2017). Thus, 
large audit firms, if compared to their small counterparties, can be seen as an active 
monitoring tool for firms’ financial statements (Asthana et al., 2015).   
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Simunic (1980) points out that exposure to loss, audit quality and other firm-specific factors 
result in alterations in audit fees. As mentioned by Abbott et al. (2003), audit committees 
infer three main roles toward external auditors: pressurise management to appoint reputed 
external auditors; demand greater audit assurance from external auditors. Simunic and Stein 
(1996) relate audit assurance (demanded by audit committees) with audit quality; audit 
committees can eradicate dismissal threat of auditors. 
Previous studies on the determinants of audit fees have emphasised on corporate governance 
and financial factors as drivers affecting audit fees. Proper internal corporate governance 
mechanisms improve transparency of financial statements and would help auditors in their 
monitoring role and thus auditors would be more able to provide accurate audit opinions 
(Khalil and Ozkan, 2016). Researchers have argued that internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as the existence of audit committee, affect the level of external audit fees. 
This is supported by McMullen (1996) who observes an inverse link between firms that 
engage in fraudulent practices and the presence of audit committee. This implies that the 
existence of an audit committee helps in improving better audit quality and financial 
reporting practices for a financially sound firm. 
 
Others find that audit committee independence is an important driver of audit fees. An audit 
committee with a majority of independent members is likely to infer independent views and 
strict monitoring (see, for example, McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996). Hence, such 
independent audit demands more audit assurance from external auditors and thereby resulting 
in high audit fees. Rainsbury et al. (2009) investigate a sample of 87 New Zealand firms and 
report a positive link between audit fees, in one hand, and total assets and account 
receivables/inventory, on the other. Interestingly, they find no evidence on the relationship 
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between the quality of audit committee and audit fees. In a similar vein, Carcello et al. (2002) 
examine the relationship between the audit committee and audit fees and report that board 
diligence (number of board meetings) and independence (percentage of independent directors 
on board) are positively related to audit fees. Accordingly, boards meeting more frequently 
and composed of independent directors will require more audit assurance from external 
auditors to enhance financial reporting quality, leading to high audit fees. Furthermore, they 
find that audit committee independence infers a positive link with audit fees as well as board 
features have an impact on audit fees. Goddard and Masters (2000) observe that audit 
features are not associated with audit fees within the UK setting. Abbott et al. (2003) detect 
that the independence of audit committee has a significant positive link with audit fees. Their 
evidence on audit fees is in line with the demand size perspective. However, they report no 
evidence for the effect of audit meeting frequency on audit fees.   
In contrast, Collier and Gregory (1996) support the supply side of audit fees in which audit 
committees infer a negative relationship with audit fees in UK sample. The reason behind the 
negative aspect is that as there is greater internal control from the audit committee, it is less 
likely for external auditors to deliver more services and assessment which consequently result 
in low audit fees. Similarly, Tsui et al. (2001) support the supply side of audit fees, in which a 
negative link is found between independent directors and audit fees. They argue that firms 
with independent boards infer strict control and monitoring of the financial reporting process 
which eventually will diminish audit services and consequently will reduce audit fees. Other 
studies find that financial reporting process is a key aspect in enhancing firm monitoring, 
with the help of both internal and external auditing. Carey et al. (2000) and Leung et al. 
(2004) emphasise that firms with proper internal corporate governance mechanisms have a 
better assessment of internal and external audit and such firms are likely to pay for these 
external audit services. 
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Lifschutz et al. (2010) analyse the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and external audit fees, in which they report that board independence and number of audit 
meetings are positively related to audit fees, thereby sustaining the demand side approach of 
audit fees. Furthermore, their evidence gives an indication that companies denoting a high 
degree of corporate governance features are more likely to require a high level of audit 
quality, from external auditors, and hence pay more audit fees. 
Similarly but from the UK context, Chan et al. (1993) examine the drivers of audit fees and 
observe that audit size infers a positive relationship with audit fees. In addition, leverage and 
liquidity do not have any impact on external audit fees. Clatworthy and Peel (2007) also 
examine if the public UK companies pay more audit fees if compared to their private 
counterparties. They report that publicly listed companies pay high audit fees if compared to 
than unquoted firms. 
Joseph et al. (2001) examine the factors affecting audit opinion using firms from eight East 
Asian countries. They find that profitability has a negative impact on audit opinion, implying 
that profitable firms are less likely to have an unqualified opinion. Farinha and Viana (2009) 
investigate the relationship between board characteristics and modified audit opinion for a 
sample of Portuguese firms for the period from 2002-2005. They find that board size has no 
significant effect on audit opinion. However, board diligence infers a positive significant link 
with opinion. This explains that the higher the frequency of board meetings, the higher the 
degree of financial reporting quality. From audit quality perspectives, Lai (2009) conducts an 
empirical analysis to examine how audit quality will affect firm-specific factors.  Using a 
logistic approach, with audit quality as dependent variable (that takes 1 if a firm is audited by 
a big 5 firm and 0 otherwise). He finds that the ratio of property, plant and plant, and firm 
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size are positively related to audit quality. Joseph et al. (2001) also apply the same approach 
and argue that firm size and leverage affect audit quality. 
From another perspective Niemi and Sundgren (2012), using Finish SMEs, investigate 
whether modified audit opinions are linked to the increasing use of trade credit if compared 
to bank debt. The study reports no association between modified audit opinion and credit 
rationing. From financial reporting perspectives, Luypaert et al. (2016) examine, using 
Belgian small firms, the financial statement filing lags. They report that only one-third of the 
financial statements (in the investigated small firms) are filed and it was suggested that the 
monetary sanctions would be seen as an effective tool to encourage the enterprises to comply 
with the deadlines. 
Based on the above discussion, this study joins the empirical literature on corporate 
governance and audit fess and aims to provide new evidence of the effect of internal 
governance tools and firm-specific factors on audit fees and audit quality within the UK 
context. Furthermore, unlike previous studies with large firms focus, we add novel insights 
regarding the audit literature as we investigate these issues in non-financial SMEs setting. We 
first highlight and analyse audit fees, followed by a robustness check of audit quality. 
Development of the Hypotheses 
In this section, the hypotheses of the internal corporate governance and firm -pecific factors 
on audit fees will be discussed. 
Board independence  
One of the key recommendations of the Cadbury Report (1992) is to include independent 
directors on the board. Independent directors help in monitoring firms to bring effective 
control and decision making to maximise firm’s value. Independent directors on the board 
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require more quality audit work, from external auditors, to deliver proper financial reporting. 
Hence, a positive relationship is expected between board independence and audit fees. 
Lifschutz et al. (2010) argue that more independent members on boards provide strict 
supervision of financial accounts and in turn, more audit services are required from external 
auditors, and hence increasing audit fees. 
O’Sullivan and Diacon (2002) investigate the link between independent directors and audit 
fees but find no significant relationship. However, other studies such as Johansen and 
Pettersson (2013), Lifschutz et al. (2010), Hay et al. (2008), Carcello et al. (2002) and 
O’Sullivan (2000) detect a positive and significant association between independent directors 
and audit fees. Al-Najjar (2015) argues that board independence is an important governance 
tool in the UK listed SMEs, and thus, we adopt the demand size of audit fees and argue that 
there is a positive relationship between independent directors and audit fees for the listed 
SMEs. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is devised: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between board independence and audit fees. 
Audit committee independence 
According to the Cadbury Report (1992), the establishment of an independent audit 
committee is important to improve the quality of financial statements. The presence of an 
audit committee within a firm stands as a key aspect of internal corporate governance. In 
most of the times, the composition of audit committee provides strict control and monitoring 
to avoid financial fraud or misstatement by engaging external auditors’ services, and thus 
leading to high audit fees. DeAngelo (1981) argues that the work of an auditor is to find any 
financial misstatements. Therefore, having an audit committee with independent directors 
will eventually lead to improve external audit quality, and in turn, to minimise the risk of 
having financial misstatements and fraud, causing audit fees to increase. Empirical evidence 
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demonstrates that audit committee independence is positively related to audit fees. Beasley et 
al. (2000) detect that firms with low audit independence are likely to experience higher 
financial fraud. Similarly, Abbott et al. (2003) argue that audit independence enhances 
financial reporting.  This implies that the higher the percentage of independent members on 
the audit committee, the higher will be the demand for audit work from external sources, and 
in turn, the higher will be the audit fees.  Hence, we argue that there is a positive relationship 
between audit independence and audit fees, which supports the demand side approach of 
audit fees. Al-Najjar (2015) supports the importance of audit committee independence in the 
listed UK SMEs and includes it in his corporate governance index and therefore, our third 
hypothesis is: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between audit independence and audit fees. 
Audit diligence 
Audit diligence is measured as the number of audit meetings held in a year. It is argued that 
frequent audit meetings will result in better auditing processes (Raghunandan et al., 2001). 
Hence, for an audit committee to be more effective and functioning properly, it has to meet 
more frequently. Empirical studies posit that audit diligence is positively associated with 
audit fees.  For example, Abbott et al. (2003) demonstrate that audit committees with 
frequent meetings (meet four times in a year) result in proper financial accounts. In other 
words, the more audit meetings, the higher the likelihood for firms to demand more audit 
assurance, for a better financial process, thus leading to high audit fees. However, they report 
no significant evidence of the relationship between audit meetings and audit fees. On the 
other hand, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) detect a positive relationship between audit 
meetings and audit fees. Research in SMEs context employs audit meetings as a key 
governance tool (see, for example, Al-Najjar, 2015). Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is: 
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H3: There is a positive relationship between audit diligence and audit fees. 
Board diligence and size 
Following the literature, we define board diligence as the number of board meetings being 
held during a year. Researchers such as Vafeas (1999) argues that effectiveness of board can 
be indexed by a high number of board meetings, since the higher the frequency of board 
meetings will indicate more monitoring of the board on the financial reporting process. 
Therefore, the effective board requires more audit services and hence more audit fees.  In this 
sense, a positive relationship is expected between board diligence and audit fees. Empirical 
evidence by Carcello et al. (2002) support such argument. We adopt similar view about the 
importance of board size in the listed SMEs (see, for example, Al-Najjar, 2015) and hence, 
our fourth hypothesis is: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between board diligence and audit fees. 
Carcello et al. (2002) argue that external auditors are more likely to indicate a lower risk for 
firms having stronger control environment, such as larger and more qualified boards, leading 
to a reduction in the external audit procedures, and thus might lead to lower audit fees. On the 
other hand, Larmous and Vafeas (2010) report a positive association between board size and 
firm value, thus large boards are more able to provide better discussion and monitoring, 
which in turn demand better audit services and increase the audit fees. Firms with large 
boards are more likely to put more pressure on a sound audit reporting system and will 
require more audit assurance from the part of external auditors. Consequently, high audit fees 
are imposed. Vafeas and Waeglein (2007) also report that board size is positively correlated 
to audit fees. Hence, similar to Al-Najjar (2015) who includes board meetings as a key 
governance tool in the listed SMEs, we posit that 
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H5: There is a positive relationship between board size and audit fees. 
Control Variables 
Following the literature, we include the following control variables: 
Audit Quality (Big 4): Big 4 audit firms are found to affect audit fees. Prior research has 
analysed the effect of big audit firms on audit fees (Peel and Clatworthy, 2001; Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent, 2006).  In the current paper, big 4 is assessed as a binary variable with the 
value of 1 for firms which are audited by big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise.  Big 4 audit firms 
offer high-quality assurance services to reduce the risk of financial misstatements and 
therefore, increasing the level of audit fees.  Hence, a positive link is expected between big 4 
and audit fees. 
Financial Reporting Quality (Opinion): Following previous empirical evidence, a positive 
relationship is expected between audit opinion and audit fees. Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 
(2006) support this relationship. Audit Opinion is defined as the quality of financial 
reporting. Audit firms categorise companies’ financial statements as unqualified (no 
misstatements) and qualified (where audit assessment is required because of the existence of 
financial misstatements).   
Loss: Loss measures audit risk and is seen as an important factor affecting audit fees as more 
risk will lead to more audit fees (Simunic, 1980). Chan et al. (1993) argue that the higher the 
level of audit work, the greater the audit risk, and as a result, the higher will be the audit fees.  
Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between loss and audit fees.   
Audit complexity: We follow Chan et al. (1993) in using two measures for complexity: a 
ratio of account receivables to total assets and inventory to total assets ratio. It is suggested 
that these costs reflect the internal control quality. Following prior empirical studies, a 
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positive association is expected between receivables and audit fees (Simon and Francis, 1988; 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006). 
Audit risk: Leverage and asset liquidity indicate audit risk, audit risk is found to be an 
important determinant of audit fees (Chan et al., 1993). Studies such as Peel and Clatworthy 
(2001) analyse a UK sample of industrial firms and find that leverage is positively related to 
audit fees. Leverage is measured as the ratio of long-term debt divided by total assets which 
is similar to previous studies such as Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006), and liquidity is 
measured as current assets to current liability ratio.  It is argued that the higher the level of 
debt and liquid assets, the more the audit risk and thus higher audit fees. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is expected between leverage (asset liquidity) and audit fees.   
International Sales: This firm-specific factor is a proxy for client complexity and is found to 
be positively related to audit fees. The higher the level of international sales (high degree of 
client complexity) will lead to higher audit fees. Hence, a positive association between 
international sales and audit fees is expected.  This factor is measured as the ratio of foreign 
sales to total assets (See, Mitra et al., 2007). 
Firm Size: Previous studies (such as Yardley et al., 1992) report that firm size is a key factor 
affecting the level of audit fees. Large firms are more likely to demand greater audit 
assurance to avoid a situation of financial misstatements or fraud.  Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent (2006) using a sample of Australian publicly listed firms find that firm size infers a 
positive relationship with audit fees. In this study, size is measured as the natural logarithm of 
turnover which is a proxy for client size (Rainsbury et al., 2009).  
Return on Assets: Chan et al. (1993) suggest that there is a relationship between audit fees 
and profitability. It is argued that a negative relationship is expected between return on assets 
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and audit fees. Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) support such relationship between 
profitability and audit fees. 
Sample and Methodology 
As mentioned before, our sample consists of non-financial UK SMEs. The sample is derived 
from FAME database using criteria set forward by Department of Trade and Industry.  
Following Company’s Act 2006 and Collis (2008), as from the year 2008, new thresholds of 
criteria have been set to define a Small and Medium Enterprise. To obtain the sample of 
small businesses, at least two criteria have to be met. Based on new thresholds (see Collis, 
2008), the number of employees has to be within 50 and 250 employees and turnover should 
be within £6.5m to £25.9m (for year 2008 and 2009).  Before the year 2008, the number of 
employees is within the range of 50 to 250; turnover within £5.6m and £22.8m. The initial 
sample after satisfying the criteria is 341 listed SMEs, after excluding 34 financial firms, the 
sample being examined in this study is 307 firms. Financial information and information 
about audit fees, audit opinion and big 4 are collected from DataStream, and corporate 
governance data (board size, board meetings, the percentage of independent directors on 
board, audit committee data) are collected from Thomson One Banker database for the period 
from 2000 to 2009.  This criterion has been adopted so to be consistent with previous studies 
in the UK SMEs context (see, for example, Belghitar and Khan 2013; Al-Najjar and AL-
Najjar, 2017; Al-Najjar, 2015).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 1 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for the variables being used in the regression 
models. It is found that logarithm of audit fees has a mean of £4.2, with a maximum of £11.5. 
Considering the corporate governance variables, on average, independent directors represent 
41.6 % of the board of directors and around 93.3 % of the audit committee, this is an 
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interesting finding as it indicates that SMEs rely on independent directors to act on the audit 
committee. This shows that our UK sample of firms meets the requirements of Cadbury 
Report concerning the independence of audit committee. On average, it is observed that the 
number of audit meetings is about 2 times in a year, explaining a relatively low frequency. 
However, this observation is justified for our sample as it is composed of listed SMEs. 
Furthermore, board size has a mean of 6 members with a maximum of 21. The number of 
board meetings held during a year is on average (around) 8 times, with a minimum of 2 and a 
maximum of 20. This indicates that more responsibilities and coordination are undertaken 
with a high level of board diligence.  For Big 4 audit firms, we find that around 45 % of the 
sample is audited by one of the big 4 audit firms. In addition, audit opinion has a mean of 
98% which denotes that 98% of the sample has an unqualified opinion showing that they 
experience no financial fraud. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the variables used in the current paper, where it can 
be deduced that there are no high bi-variate correlations among the variables. It can be seen 
that board independence and audit independence are not highly correlated. In addition, board 
meetings are not highly correlated with audit meetings. Finally, firm size is positively 
correlated with audit fees, indicating large firms will pay more audit fees. Hence, 
multicollinearity is not an issue in our models 
Audit Fees Model 
Following Abbott et al. (2003), Carcello et al. (2002), and Tsui et al. (2001), we use the 
following model. However, this model is not restricted to the abovementioned studies as 
additional corporate governance and control variables are included to find more evidence on 
the UK listed SMEs data. The standard errors are classified within firms to capture the group 
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effects. It is worth noting that the clustered firms are 126 that we can use to estimate the 
models. The drop of data is due to the missing corporate governance factors. 
Feesit= β0+ β1InDirit+ β2 AuIndit + β3 AudMeetit + β4BMeetit + β4BSizeit + β5Big4it+ β6Opinit+ 
β7Lossit + β8Recit + β9Invit+ β10 Crit + β11 Levit + β12 IntSalesit + β13 Sizeit + β14 ROAit +εit  
 
Where, “Fees” is the dependent variable measured as the natural logarithm of audit fees; 
InDir is the percentage of independent directors on board of directors; AudInd is the 
percentage of independent directors on audit committee; AudMeet is the number of audit 
meetings held in a year; BMeet is the number of meetings in a year; BSize is number of 
directors on the board; Big4 is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if firm is audited by big 4 
audit firms, 0 otherwise; Opin is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if a firm has an 
unqualified opinion, 0 otherwise; Loss is a dummy variable taking value of 1 for firms having 
2 years of consecutive loss, 0 otherwise; Rec is measured as ratio of receivables to total 
assets; Inv is defined as total inventories to total assets; Cr is the ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities; Lev is measured as ratio of long-term debt to total assets; IntSales is 
defined as international sales to total assets; Size is the natural logarithm of turnover; ROA is 
the return on assets; ε is error term.   
It is also worth noting that we include year dummies and industry dummies to our models, to 
control for secular trends and other non-modelled effects, but for parsimony, we do not report 
the coefficients in the tables. 
Results 
The findings of the audit fees model are reported in Table 3 where the dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of audit fees. There are four models to show the effects of year and 
industry dummies. Model 1 is regressed without year and industry effects; Model 2 contains 
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year dummies with no industry effect; Model 3 encompasses industry dummies with no year 
effect; Model 4 assesses both year and industry effects.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Regarding the main variables of interest which are the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, board independence is found to be positively associated with audit fees. This 
result is in line with our hypothesis and the findings of Johansen and Pettersson (2013), Hay 
et al. (2008), O’Sullivan (2000) and Carcello et al. (2002). This indicates that the more 
independence the board is, the better their governance role and thus enhancing strict control 
and monitoring of financial conditions. Thus, they demand further audit assurance from 
external auditors. This will lead to increase audit fees. 
As regards audit independence, we report some evidence of a negative relationship with audit 
fees in Models 3 and 4. This result is not consistent with our hypothesis and the results of 
Abbot et al. (2003) but can be seen as an evidence for the supply side for audit fees in our 
sample.  In addition, we report a positive and significant relationship between audit meetings 
and audit fees. This result is consistent with our hypothesis (H3) and other studies such as 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) and Lifschutz et al. (2010). The positive influence of audit 
diligence is explained in a way that the more audit meeting frequency, the better monitoring 
and coordination to avoid any risk of financial fraud which requires more audit services from 
external auditors, and therefore high audit fees are prevalent. Moreover, we find supportive 
evidence that board size is positively related to audit fees.  This result is in line with H5 and 
the argument of Vafeas and Waeglein (2007) that firms with large boards demand 
comprehensive audit reporting system and require more audit assurance from external 
auditors. Finally, we couldn’t find support for the relationship between board diligence and 
audit fees.  
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For the audit variables (audit opinion and big 4), no evidence is found to impact the level of 
audit fees. In terms of control variables, loss, leverage and size are found to have a significant 
effect on audit fees with the expected signs. 
Accordingly, we argue that our sample of SMEs share the same determinants of audit fees as 
those for large listed firms. The direction of the relationship might differ yet the governance 
factors in our SMEs are of similar importance as in large firms. Thus, we argue that corporate 
governance mechanisms in SMEs are key determinants of audit services (audit fees). 
It is worth noting that we check for any endogeneity issue between corporate governance and 
audit fees, we use IV modelling with lagged of the corporate governance factors as 
instruments and report the results in Table 4. The findings show a positive relationship 
between board independence and audit fees as well as there is some evidence of a negative 
association between audit independence and audit fees. Also, a positive relationship is 
reported between audit meetings and audit fees as well as a positive association between 
board size and audit fees. Finally, our results show no support for a relationship between 
board meetings and audit fees. All of these results are consistent with our previous findings, 
reported in Table 3.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
Determinants of Audit quality 
For a further check of our results, we introduce another audit quality variable, which is 
related to the selection of the big 4 audit firms. We aim to investigate if our main corporate 
governance factors (board independence, audit independence, audit diligence, board 
diligence, and board size) affect the decision to go for one of the big four audit firms. We 
posit that better internal corporate governance will demand more audit quality. Hence, we 
 
20 
 
argue that firms with large boards, and more independent directors, as well as have audit 
committee independence, and more frequent audit and board meetings are more likely to 
employ one of the big four audit firms. The positive association between audit quality and 
corporate governance has been supported by different studies (see, for example, Beasley and 
Petroni, 2001) and therefore, our hypothesis is: 
 H6: There is a positive relationship between corporate governance factors and audit quality. 
To test for H6 we advance the following model: 
Big4it= β0 + β1InDirit + β2AudIndit+ β3 AudMeetit+ β4 BoardMeetit+ β5 BSizeit +β5 Sizeit 
                + β6  Levit+ εit 
 
Where the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is audited 
by big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are: InDir is the percentage 
of independent directors on board of directors; AudInd is the percentage of independent 
directors on audit committee; AudMeet is number of audit meetings in a year; BMeet is the 
number of board meetings in a year; BSize is number of directors among the board; we 
follow the literature (see Joseph et al., 2001; Lai, 2009) and control for leverage and size: Lev 
is measured as the ratio of long-term debt divided by total assets; Size is defined as the 
natural logarithm of turnover; ε is error term.  
The results of audit quality are reported in Table 5. Three models are regressed each differing 
in year and industry effects. Considering the variables of main interest, it can be deduced that 
there is a positive evidence of board independence on the selection of the big four audit firms. 
This shows that the more independent directors on the board, the more likely will a firm be 
audited by a big 4 audit firm, as independent directors look over the best quality audit process 
for a firm. This result is consistent with our hypothesis (H6) and the findings of Beasley and 
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Petroni (2001). Furthermore, there is a positive association between audit meetings and the 
selection of Big 4 audit firms in our models. This explains that the higher the frequency of 
audit meetings, the more audit assurance is demanded, and in turn, the best audit firms will be 
selected by the company. This result is in line with our Hypothesis (H6) and the results of 
Abbott and Parker (2000) who report that firms with audit committees that met at least twice 
a year were more likely to opt for highly specialised external auditors. Audit independence 
and board diligence are found to have no significant impact on audit quality. Hence, there is 
some evidence that good governance control will result in more audit quality, which is 
consistent with H6. Regarding the control variables, leverage is found to be positively related 
to the selection of Big 4 audit firms, explaining that firms with high debt structure are more 
likely to be audited by one of the big 4 because of their financing structure, firm size is found 
to be negatively related to audit quality. Accordingly, we find supporting evidence that better 
governance tools lead to better audit quality, in terms of selecting one of the big 4 audit firms.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
We also the run the models with the lagged corporate governance to check for any 
endogeneity in the corporate governance factors, the results are similar to those reported in 
Table 5. It is worth that we investigated the causality and endogeneity between audit fees and 
Big 4 selection the results show no significant endogeneity issue between the two variables.  
Overall conclusion  
This paper is the first major study to investigate if corporate governance tools affect the audit 
features within SMEs context. Our sample includes 307 SMEs for the period from 2000 to 
2009. We employ different cross sectional-time series analysis, including time seriers-cross 
sectional OLS, IV modelling and logit. In particular, this study aims to investigate if internal 
governance mechanisms, such as board independence, audit independence, audit diligence as 
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well as board diligence and size affect different audit features, (audit fees, audit and big 4 
audit firms). Our results show that corporate governance mechanisms are important in 
determining audit fees. We detect a positive impact of board independence, audit meeting and 
board size on audit fees. Also, we report some evidence of a negative relationship between 
audit independence and audit fees, which supports the supply side of audit fees. In addition, 
we report that governance factors affect audit quality. We detect that independent directors 
and audit diligence positively affect the decision to select big 4 audit firms.   
Overall, our results provide new evidence that corporate governance mechanisms of listed 
SMEs affect audit features. Hence, corporate governance factors that affect audit fees in large 
firms are similar to those affect listed SMEs. However, their impact might be different within 
the SMEs context. In addition, firm specific-factors are found to affect the audit features in a 
similar fashion as in large firms. Thus, SMEs are encouraged to follow teamwork 
management not individual management approach to improve the audit performance and 
financial reporting. 
Our findings have different implications for policymakers and managers. First, policymakers 
need to provide rules, regulations and legislations for SMEs to enhance the role of good 
governance in such enterprises. In addition, SMEs managers are encouraged to adopt proper 
governance tools as such tools are proved to improve audit services and audit quality. For 
example, employing independent directors and encourage more meetings for audit 
committees will help in improving audit quality. It is indeed important for SMEs to have 
large boards, to ensure more discussions about strategic decisions, and hence large boards 
employing more independent directors are seen to be active in firm’s monitoring.  
Finally, similar to all archival studies with the same notion, this study has a number of 
limitations. First, our sample is restricted to listed SMEs and hence our results should be 
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interpreted within this focus and other studies are invited to include a larger set of SMEs so 
the results can be generalised. However, it is important to note that the availability of the 
governance factors for such dataset might be limited and this is the reason behind our study to 
adopt this sample. In addition, there are different definitions used for SMEs, while we have 
used similar definitions to related studies in the UK, yet other definitions (European 
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/CE) can be used, especially if the sample is large 
since adopting European commission definition might reduce the number of enterprises 
selected in the sample. Finally, other governance tools could be investigated, this might 
include, but not limited to CEO characteristics and ownership structure.    
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Audit Fees 4.204 0.988 0 11.493 
InDir 0.416 0.201 0 1 
AudInd 0.933 0.202 0 1 
AudMeet 2.366 0.850 1 6 
BSize 6.087 2.494 1 21 
BoardMeet 8.781 2.953 2 20 
Big4 0.449 0.497 0 1 
Opinion 0.976 0.152 0 1 
Loss 0.299 0.458 0 1 
Receivables 0.342 5.073 0 248.158 
Inventories 0.082 0.131 0 0.923 
Liquidity 2.550 3.980 0.004 58.882 
Leverage 0.077 0.143 0 0.961 
IntSales 0.263 0.430 0 5.053 
Size 9.302 1.335 0 14.173 
ROA -0.062 0.36 -0.99 0.99 
Audit fees is defined as the natural logarithm of external audit fees; InDir as ratio of independent directors; AudInd as ratio of independent 
directors on audit committees; BSize as number of board directors; BoardMeet is the number of board meetings; Big4 is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if firms are audited by big 4 audit firms and 0 otherwise; Opinion is coded as 1 for firms with unqualified opinion and 0 
otherwise; loss takes the value of 1 for firms having a loss for 2 consecutive years and 0 otherwise; receivables is measured as the ratio of 
receivables to total assets; inventories as the ratio of inventories to total assets; liquidity as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities; 
leverage as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; IntSales as the ratio of international sales to total assets; size as the natural logarithm of 
turnover; ROA is the return on assets. 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
Variables Log Audit Fees 
 
InDir AudInd AudMeet BSize BoardMeet Big5 Opinion Loss Receivables Inventories Liquidity Leverage IntSales Size ROA 
Log Audit Fees 1.000 
 
               
InDir 0.303 
 
1.000               
AudInd 0.081 
 
0.255 1.000              
AudMeet 0.423 
 
0.205 0.195 1.000             
BSize 0.188 
 
-0.228 0.184 0.231 1.000            
BoardMeet -0.056 
 
0.045 0.257 0.035 0.006 1.000           
Big4 0.052 
 
0.109 0.109 0.155 0.023 0.093 1.000          
Opinion -0.023 
 
-0.006 -0.038 0.016 0.021 -0.057 0.063 1.000         
Loss 0.052 
 
0.035 0.082 0.059 0.082 0.005 -0.003 -0.044 1.000        
Receivables -0.202 
 
-0.058 -0.021 -0.227 -0.049 0.080 -0.082 0.008 -0.078 1.000       
Inventories -0.064 
 
0.059 -0.102 -0.019 -0.222 -0.091 -0.005 -0.003 -0.057 0.029 1.000      
Liquidity -0.042 
 
-0.001 -0.015 0.047 0.033 -0.043 -0.018 0.016 0.118 -0.042 0.122 1.000     
Leverage 0.230 
 
0.069 0.034 0.054 0.061 -0.094 0.196 0.036 -0.035 -0.186 -0.011 -0.292 1.000    
IntSales 0.057 
 
0.043 -0.082 0.057 -0.036 -0.055 -0.045 -0.155 0.012 0.141 0.284 0.085 -0.142 1.000   
Size 0.552 
 
0.166 0.059 0.405 0.133 -0.019 0.014 -0.067 -0.227 -0.164 0.058 -0.261 0.217 0.240 1.000  
ROA -0.032 
 
-0.019 -0.002 0.024 -0.026 0.010 0.012 -0.017 -0.649 0.067 0.095 -0.025 -0.008 0.087 0.224 1.000 
Note: Variables as described in Table 1 
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Table 3 Determinants of Audit Fees Regression results 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Audit Fees 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Independent 
Variables: 
 
    
InDir 
 
1.273*** 
(0.000) 
 
1.271*** 
(0.000) 
1.185*** 
(0.000) 
1.187*** 
(0.000) 
AudInd 
 
-0.361  
(0.156) 
 
-0.367  
(0.151) 
-0.474** 
(0.042) 
 
-0.474**  
(0.042) 
AudMeet 
 
0.136** 
(0.015) 
 
0.119** 
(0.019) 
0.134** 
(0.015) 
0.121** 
(0.020) 
BoardMeet 
 
-0.011  
(0.527) 
 
-0.011  
(0.518) 
-0.009 
 (0.592) 
-0.001  
(0.566) 
BSize 
 
0.038**  
(0.020) 
 
0.041**  
(0.009) 
0.041**  
(0.017) 
0.045**  
(0.006) 
Big4 
 
-0.033 
 (0.739) 
 
-0.038  
(0.700) 
-0.006  
(0.954) 
-0.011  
(0.912) 
Opinion 
 
-0.049  
(0.804) 
 
-0.064  
(0.751) 
-0.011 
(0.952) 
-0.031  
(0.862) 
Loss 
 
0.165  
(0.183) 
 
0.182  
(0.149) 
0.176 
 (0.158) 
0.201* 
(0.107) 
Receivables 
 
-0.074  
(0.562) 
 
-0.070 
 (0.587) 
0.006  
(0.951) 
0.009  
(0.930) 
Inventories 
 
-0.694  
(0.339) 
 
-0.625  
(0.385) 
-0.780  
(0.280) 
-0.661  
(0.359) 
Liquidity 
 
0.048** 
(0.013) 
 
0.045** 
(0.015) 
0.045** 
(0.025) 
0.043** 
(0.030) 
Leverage 
 
1.080** 
(0.046) 
 
1.094** 
(0.049) 
0.898* 
(0.106) 
0.919*  
(0.106) 
IntSales 
 
-0.122  
(0.447) 
 
-0.127  
(0.427) 
-0.073  
(0.652) 
-0.076  
(0.634) 
Size 
 
0.398 *** 
(0.000) 
 
0.413*** 
(0.000) 
0.403*** 
(0.000) 
0.413*** 
(0.000) 
ROA 
 
-0.003  
(0.339) 
 
-0.003 
(0.316) 
-0.002  
(0.520) 
-0.002  
(0.489) 
Constant 
 
-0.105  
(0.881) 
-0.227 
(0.744) 
-0.234  
(0.724) 
-0.326  
(0.620) 
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes 
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Industry Dummies 
 
No No Yes Yes 
No of clustered firms 
 
307 307 307 307 
R2 
 
0.4574 0.4725 0.4838 0.4979 
F-Test 
 
12.81*** 
(0.000) 
 14.53*** 
(0.000) 
 
Note: Variables are defined in Table1. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. It is worth 
noting that from the 307 SMEs only 126 provide the required information to run the models. 
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Table 4 IV model-Audit fees 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Audit Fees 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Independent Variables: 
 
    
InDir 
1.347*** 1.346*** 1.241*** 1.236*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AudInd 
-0.370 -0.373 -0.510** -0.507** 
(0.125) (0.122) (0.034) (0.033) 
AudMeet 
0.140** 0.134** 0.138** 0.135** 
(0.012) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) 
BoardMeet 
-0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 
(0.418) (0.426) (0.470) (0.472) 
BSize 
0.044*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Big4 
-0.061 -0.064 -0.013 -0.016 
(0.380) (0.362) (0.851) (0.819) 
Opinion 
-0.181 -0.185 -0.127 -0.136 
(0.439) (0.435) (0.578) (0.558) 
Loss 
0.142 0.156 0.147 0.162 
(0.191) (0.153) (0.176) (0.140) 
Receivables 
-0.029 -0.029 0.039 0.041 
(0.828) (0.829) (0.770) (0.759) 
Inventories 
-0.741* -0.709* -0.862* -0.807* 
(0.068) (0.081) (0.055) (0.074) 
Liquidity 
0.042** 0.040* 0.037* 0.035* 
(0.043) (0.055) (0.080) (0.094) 
Leverage 
1.095*** 1.080** 0.888** 0.882** 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.033) (0.034) 
IntSales 
-0.144 -0.147 -0.096 -0.099 
(0.209) (0.204) (0.396) (0.387) 
Size 
0.366*** 0.371*** 0.371*** 0.374*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.381) (0.406) (0.904) (0.938) 
Constant 
0.290 0.239 0.174 0.140 
(0.578) (0.648) (0.734) (0.786) 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes 
Industry dunnies No No Yes Yes 
R2 0.4572 0.4599 0.4864 0.4885 
Wald-X 272.61*** 275.56*** 307.74*** 310.18*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Note: Variables are defined in Table1. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. It is worth 
noting that from the 307 SMEs only 126 provide the required information to run the models. 
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Table 5 Logistic Findings of Determinants of Big4 
Dependent Variable: Big 5 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Independent Variables: 
 
   
InDir 
 
1.021 
(0.144) 
 
0.997  
(0.151) 
0.800  
(0.234) 
AudInd 
 
1.091 
 (0.171) 
 
1.113 
 (0.161) 
0.892  
(0.253) 
AudMeet 
 
0.585*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.587*** 
(0.000) 
0.502** 
(0.000) 
BoardMeet 
 
0.049  
(0.192) 
 
0.046  
(0.219) 
0.057  
(0.109) 
BSize 
 
-0.014  
(0.748) 
 
-0.017  
(0.697) 
-0.008  
(0.840) 
Size 
 
-0.356** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.357** 
(0.001) 
-0.294**  
(0.002) 
Leverage 
 
3.597** 
(0.002) 
 
3.607** 
(0.001) 
3.520**  
(0.001) 
Constant 
 
0.227  
(0.854) 
 
0.276  
(0.815) 
-0.234 
(0.835) 
Year Dummies 
 
Yes No No 
Industry Dummies 
 
Yes Yes No 
No of clustered firms 
 
307 307 307 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.094 0.094 0.0617 
F-Test 
 
65.94*** 
(0.000) 
66.11*** 
(0.000) 
43.48*** 
(0.000) 
Note: variables are defined in Table 1. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
